This is the last significant feature in Bitcoin Core to depend on OpenSSL, and a PR has been opened to complete the removal of that dependency. In this monthly feature, we highlight some of the top-voted questions and answers posted since our last update. Also included are a selection of popular questions and answers from the Bitcoin Stack Exchange and a short list of notable changes to popular Bitcoin infrastructure projects. This week’s newsletter describes a demo implementation of eltoo and several discussions related to it, requests comments on limiting the normal number of LN gossip updates to one per day, and provides our longest-to-date list of notable changes to popular Bitcoin infrastructure projects. This week’s newsletter requests feedback on not allowing P2SH-wrapped addresses for taproot, describes proposed changes to script resource limits in tapscript, and mentions a discussion about watchtower storage costs. This week’s newsletter relays a security announcement for LN implementations, describes a non-interactive coinjoin proposal, and notes a few changes in popular Bitcoin infrastructure projects. On one side of the bitcoin wallet spectrum, there are wallets that are easy to use, but that require users to give up levels of security in exchange for that ease of use.

Plus, there are even websites where you can get paid to play games, take surveys, view ads, click on content and more. Indeed, a 2016 study found that 30 percent of people open phishing emails, https://youtu.be/ and 13 percent of those then click on the attachment or link. ● Eltoo sample implementation and discussion: on the Lightning-Dev mailing list, Richard Myers posted a link to a sample implementation of an eltoo payment flow between nodes on a custom signet. He requests feedback from anyone who thinks that will cause a problem for users of any current implementation. Myers’s sample implementation works by using the Bitcoin Core functional test framework to simulate payments in an eltoo payment channel. 3401 caps the amount of onchain fee that a node will propose paying in a channel update transaction (commitment transaction), limiting it to 50% of the node’s current in-channel balance (the 50% default is adjustable). In the thread, Christian Decker notes that both current watchtowers (as implemented by LND) and future watchtowers for eltoo can have essentially O(1) costs (fixed costs) per user by having each person use a session key to update their latest state information on the watchtower. ● Watchtower storage costs: a discussion on the Lightning-Dev mailing list examined the storage requirements for current watchtowers as well as watchtowers for proposed eltoo-based payment channels.

● Comment if you expect to need P2SH-wrapped taproot addresses: recent discussion on the Bitcoin-Dev mailing list indicates that the bip-taproot proposal may be amended to disallow creating taproot inputs by paying P2SH outputs (the way you can currently use P2WPKH and P2WSH inputs created from P2SH outputs). LN-eltoo accomplishes the same goal by giving the later states the ability to spend funds from earlier states within a certain period of time-eliminating the need for a penalty, simplifying many aspects of the protocol, and reducing the complexity of many proposed protocol enhancements. LN-penalty prevents counterparty theft by giving nodes the ability to financially penalize a counterparty that attempts to publish an old channel state onchain. RedGrittyBrick and Murch explain that a transaction’s inclusion in an invalid block does not have any impact on the validity of that transaction or its ability to be confirmed in subsequent blocks. ● What happens to transactions included in invalid blocks? 15759 increases the number of outbound connections the node will make from 8 to 10. The two new connections will only be used to announce and relay new blocks; they won’t announce or relay unconfirmed transactions or addr peer-discovery messages.

An adversary that can map all of a node’s connections can attack that node, either by identifying which transactions originate from that node (a privacy leak) or by isolating the node from the rest of the network (potentially making theft of funds from the node possible). Only announcing blocks minimizes the bandwidth and memory overhead of the new connections and makes it much more difficult for an adversary to map the connections between nodes. For details on how an adversary could map the network topology using transaction relay, see the TxProbe paper. 2816 adds support for testing on the signet network (see signet description in the news section above). Recently, an Optech contributor surveyed many popular wallets and Bitcoin exchanges to see what technical features they supported. In most cases, they’ll use technical analysis to try and predict price movements and exploit bid-ask spread and other inefficiencies to make a profit.